Abstract-This paper investigates generation of a secret key from a reciprocal wireless channel. In particular we consider wireless channels that exhibit sparse structure in the wideband regime and study the impact of sparsity on the secret key capacity. We explore this problem in two steps. First, we study key generation from a state-dependent discrete memoryless multiple source. The state of the source captures the effect of channel sparsity. Secondly, we consider a wireless channel model that captures channel sparsity and correlation between the legitimate users' channel and the eavesdropper's channel. Such dependency can significantly reduce the secret key capacity.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE FUNDAMENTAL limit of secret key generation from discrete memoryless multiple source (DMMS) is developed by Ahlswede, Csiszár [1] and Maurer [2] . Their results show that if X, Y, Z (respectively observed by Alice, Bob and Eve) are correlated with a known distribution, it is possible to generate a secret key between Alice and Bob at a positive rate through public discussion. The resulting information rate leaked to Eve can be made arbitrarily small. The supremum of achievable secret key rates is called the secret key capacity.
Since their work, there have been many extensions to explore the secret key capacity of more complicated models. In [3, 4] , users observe a DMMS and also transmit information via wiretap channel [5] , but there is no access to public channel for discussion. The authors in [6] [7] [8] [9] consider a wiretap channel influenced by a random channel state, known by one (or both) of the legitimate users. In such models, the random channel state can be viewed as a kind of correlated source shared by receiver/transmitter which also influences the transmission medium and thus the secrecy capacity. In [10, 11] , key generation from a DMMS is considered where, in [10] , the DMMS is excited by a deterministic source and, in [11] , by a random source. This sender-excited model is motivated by an application in which key generation is based on the inherent randomness of a reciprocal wireless channel. Consider a situation where Alice and Bob transmit a sounding signal to each other over a reciprocal wireless channel. Due to channel reciprocity, Alice and Bob observe a pair of dependent sources of randomness. Such a source turns out to be a good one for secret key generation. The first reason is that the medium is ubiquitous and the second is that wireless hardware is nowadays common. Thus, this general setting has received much attention in terms of both theory and implementation [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] . A second reason for the strong interest in this modality is that such a source can be difficult to eavesdrop upon because the wireless channel can vary quickly in both spatial and temporal dimensions. Indeed, much prior work makes the assumption that the eavesdropper channel is statistically independent of the main channel (the channel between Alice and Bob). This assumption will be roughly correct when key generation occurs in a rich scattering environment. However, there is growing experimental evidence, e.g., [20] [21] [22] [23] , and physical arguments, e.g., [24] [25] [26] , that show that realistic wireless channels are sparse at large bandwidths. The effect of channel sparsity on secret key capacity is twofold: first, it reduces the number of degrees-of-freedom 1 (DoF) of the main (Alice-Bob) channel and, second, it induces spatial correlation [27] . The first reduces the secret key capacity in the absence of an eavesdropper, while the second increases spatial correlation and therefore Eve's ability to observe the main channel.
We revisit the key generation problem when the channel exhibits sparsity in the wideband regime. We model such channel characteristics through a sparsity pattern that defines the support of the non-zero channel coefficients. Depending on the environment, the sparsity pattern can experience slow or fast time variation. The channel model we introduce also captures the dependence between the main channel and Eve's observations. To study secret key generation in this context define a state-dependent discrete multiple memoryless source (SD-DMMS). We particularize the model for the statistical characterization of sparse wireless channels where the sparsity pattern plays the role of the channel state and develop results on ergodic capacity and secrecy outage.
In analogy to communication over a fading channel, two regimes are studied. The regime of interest will be a function of the system delay constraint:
• Ergodic regime (the delay tolerant regime): If the key is generated based on observations across a large number of independently realized sparsity patterns, we will find that the ergodic secret key capacity is well-defined in the Shannon sense. A main technical constraint is that the system must be able to accommodate long delays.
• Non-ergodic regime (the delay stringent regime): If the source sequence is not observed for a sufficiently long time or if the channel state changes so slowly that the key generation is forced to occur within a period of constant state, not known to the transmitter, the capacity in the Shannon sense is not defined. In this setting, we consider the secrecy outage probability which measures the probability that the instantaneous state condition cannot support the key rate while fulfilling the secrecy condition (we will later define this formally). While both ergodic and non-ergodic secrecy have been studied before (the latter in the state-dependent, fading, wiretap channel (e.g., [28, 29] )), the impact of channel sparsity has not been studied. Regarding the ergodic regime, we show that when a white sounding sequence is adopted in the wideband (low power) regime, a sparser channel can achieve a higher secret key rate than a richer channel can. This is analogous to capacity behavior in sparse multi-antenna channels in [30] . Furthermore, at each signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), there is an adequate bandwidth that maximizes the secret key rate. Regarding the non-ergodic regime, we show that the system can achieve an exponential decaying outage probability by using an α-backoff scheme (0 < α ≤ 1) in which secret key rate is a fraction α of the ergodic capacity. Unlike in the ergodic case, a richer channel always has a larger exponent characterizing the decay of the outage probability. In a similar vein as communication over a fading channel, this demonstrates that a large number of DoF helps to smooth out the effect of the unknown state.
The paper is organized as following. In Section II we give some definitions and describe the system model. This includes the correlated sparse wireless channel model, the definition of the SD-DMMS, and the one-way discussion key generation protocol. In Section III, we investigate the ergodic secret key capacity of SD-DMMS and apply this to key generation from a sparse wireless channel. Outage is defined in Section IV. We give a necessary and sufficient condition for an outage event and explore the outage probability when an α-backoff scheme is used. Detailed proofs are deferred to the Appendix.
II. DEFINITIONS AND SYSTEM MODEL
In this paper we are motivated by key generation based on wireless channel that exhibits sparsity in the delay domain. In Section II-A we first specify our model of sparse wireless channels. While earlier works on sparse wireless channels, e.g., see [20, [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] , require the modeling of only a single channel, in Section II-A we need to model a pair of channels and their interaction: the main (Alice-to-Bob) channel and Eve's correlated observation of that main channel. Motivated by reciprocal wireless channels, in Section II-B we develop an abstracted state-dependent discrete multiple source (SD-DMMS) model. In this model the "state" captures the effect of the time-varying sparsity pattern while the key itself is extracted from the conditionally-generated (conditioned on the sparsity pattern) channel fades. Finally, in Section II-C the one-way public discussion key generation protocol is formally presented.
A. Sparse reciprocal wireless channel
Consider a wireless communication system with bandwidth W . Say that the channel exhibits sparsity in the delay domain 2 where τ max is the maximum delay spread of the channel. Then, L max = τ max W is the maximum number of resolvable paths. A sounding sequence
is transmitted over time period T 0 , where
The sounding sequence is a known sequence with power d H d = P . We assume that each two-way (Alice Bob) sounding is done within a channel coherence period (i.e., T coh 2T 0 ). Further multiple channel soundings (indexed by t) are performed within non-overlapping coherence periods. This means that the sets of soundings are jointly statistically independent.
The channel outputs in sounding interval t are
where
T is the vector of sampled (virtual) channel coefficients [24, 36] , and D is an N × L max Toeplitz matrix where N = N d + L max − 1:
A widely used sounding signal is a sequence whose spectrum is asymptotically white in N d . In this case D is a full columnrank matrix such that
Another such example is a pseudo-random (PN) sequence such as is used in spread spectrum system [37] . The noise terms W 1 2 In this paper, we consider channel sparsity in the delay domain. It is not difficult to extend the result to the sparsity in either the Doppler or spatial domains, see, e.g., [24] [25] [26] 35] . 3 Here and in the following, we say g(x n ) . = g if g(x n ) → g when n is sufficiently large.
1) Sparse channel model:
Most channels that have a small number of physical paths will exhibit sparsity in the delay domain as the signal bandwidth W increases. In particular, in some sets of delay bins, indexed by , the corresponding channel coefficients, H ab, [t] , will be zero. In this paper, we adopt the sub-linear law model considered in previous work [34, 35] to capture the sparse channel characteristic. In this model, the channel is called δ-sparse if the average number of non-zero channel coefficients scales as
The channel sparsity pattern of the main channel in sounding interval t is
where the set S = {0, 1} and E [t] . A rich multipath channel corresponds to δ → 1.
The sparsity pattern S ab [t] will, in general, be time-varying. However, in most case of interest, S ab [t] will change much more slowly than the channel coefficients H ab [t] . This is because the main reflectors, by which paths are resolved by different delay bins, move more slowly than the phase changes that induces the time-variations in fading coefficients [36, 38, 39] . The result of this disparity is that the secret key will mostly be derived from the randomness in channel coefficients rather than from that in the sparsity pattern (which has a much lower entropy rate). Furthermore, there exists good techniques to estimate the sparsity pattern reliably based on a few observations, e.g., [40] . Thus, we consider S ab [t] to be known to Alice and Bob. Let T be the number of channel sounding periods during which the sparsity pattern remains constant. We term this the sparsity coherence period. Thus, the m-th sparsity coherent period extends from t = (m − 1)T + 1 to t = mT . In this interval S ab [t] remains constant, i.e., we assume that for all t,
We further assume that S ab [t] is independent across periods.
Modeling the distribution of the state itself is a difficult task, so we consider a simple model
for all . In other words, the S ab, is a binary random variable according to a Bernoulli distribution with parameter ρ (denoted Bern (ρ)).
2) Eavesdropper's correlation model:
Eve's channel output is similar to (2) 4 : [t] , and each element is distributed according to CN 0, υ 2 . Similar to (5), Eve's probability that S e, = 0 for any particular is denoted as ρ e , i.e., Pr(S e, = 1) = (τ max W )
We model the correlation between H e [t] and H ab [t] in a two-step process as follows:
• Correlation between S e and S ab : For each delay bin , the probability that Eve has non-zero channel gain given S ab, is
• Correlation between individual channel coefficient: For those channel coefficients in the "common support" delay bins, i.e., in the set { : S ab, = S e, = 1}, the correlation coefficients are
The parameter θ captures the expected fraction of coefficients that the main channel and Eve's channel have in common. One can think of the relationship between the state (i.e., the sparsity pattern) of the main channel and that of the eavesdropper's observation as a binary memoryless channel. However, because Eve's marginal channel is δ esparse, the channel need not be symmetric so, in general, Pr(S e, = 1|S ab, = 0) = Pr(S e, = 0|S ab, = 1). This is illustrated in Figure 1 . Finally, the parameter η captures the effect that the paths (of both channel) located in the common delay bin shares the same physical scattering.
Remark 1: The model parameter space {(θ, η), δ, δ e } captures many scenarios of interest. One important aspect to capture is the the correlation between Eve and main channels. There are two main considerations that factor into modeling this correlation. The first is the distance between Eve and Bob, which mainly affects the leakage to Eve. The second is the richness/sparseness of the multipath, which affects both the amount of leakage to Eve and the level of common 4 In order to get meaningful observations, we assume Eve is located close to one of the users. So only one of the two Eve's channel outputs during the two-way sounding correlates with the main channel. The other output is independent of the main channel due to fast spatial decorrelation. The model could, of course, be extended to the situation where Eve gets two looks. Physically, Eve would have to control two monitors, one located near Alice, the other near Bob, effectively a scenario with two cooperating eavesdroppers. 5 In the signal model, we assume Eve's channel has the same maximum delay spread τmax as the main channel for convenience. In sparse channels, a subset of coefficients from the set {1, 2, ..., Lmax} will be dominantly non-vanishing and the size of this non-vanishing support is more important. Effectively this difference in the two channels is reflected in the different sparsity parameters δ, δe. randomness between Alice and Bob. When, for example, Eve gets close to Bob we would expect δ e → δ and both θ and η to increase, increasing leakage. The parameter pair (δ, δ e ), and thus (ρ, ρ e ), controls the maximum number of DoF. As a second example, say that the separation between Eve and Bob and Alice is fixed. Then, for sparser channels, the common channel coefficients between Eve's channel and the main channel will generally exhibit a stronger correlation (larger η). The underlying reasons for this are a little subtle and are based on the idea of path partitioning, as discussed in [24, 36] . Essentially, in a sparse multipath environment, a common channel coefficient (with the same index in both channels) is likely to be generated by the same underlying physical propagation paths, leading to a higher correlation. Whereas, in a rich environment, with a very large number of propagation paths, there is more mixing of physical propagation paths across channel coefficients, which would generally result in a lower correlation between the common non-zero coefficients of Eve's channel and the main channel. We note that in the limit of extremely rich multipath, all channel coefficients will be non-zero and hence common to both Eve's and main channel and at the same time all coefficients will be uncorrelated due to a rich mixing of propagation paths across channel coefficients. The exact dynamics of these changes in θ and η as Eve moves would depend on the particulars of the physical environment.
To generate a secret key, users repeat the two-way channel sounding (2) (and (6)) T M times. The key is distilled from the super-block pair
. We concentrate on situations in which Eve also has access to S ab [t] . This is depicted in Fig. 2 . This means our main results will be conservative in the sense that users cannot take advantage of the common randomness due to S ab [t] . However, as we will discuss after Corollary 2, this potential loss in secret key capacity will become negligible when the state changes sufficiently slowly. Furthermore, we consider the situation that given a power constraint, users can adapt their sounding power to prior knowledge of statistic of channel sparsity ρ. However, we don't consider a scenario in which the users' sounding policy can adapt to an instantaneous sparsity vector S ab [t] , since the S ab [t] would be obtained after channel sounding.
In the following section we abstract away the actual sounding process and specify a state-dependent source model where the state varies more slowly than the underlying sourcerealization process from which the key is generated. When
we study the ergodic case, we will let M grow arbitrarily large while we will hold T constant, a constant that indicates the number of source realizations for which the state remains the same. When we study the outage case, M = 1, and T can be large.
B. State-dependent discrete memoryless multiple source
To leverage results on information theoretic security, we consider the state-dependent (SD) DMMS model depicted in Figure 2 . The observation triple ). Since the states vary more slowly than the conditionally-generated sources, there is a length of time T during which the states remain constant. This corresponds to the sparsity coherence period discussed earlier. A large T means that the states are changing slowly. As mentioned earlier, we assume that states are available to the corresponding observers and that, in addition, Eve also knows the state of the legitimate users. In other words, Alice and Bob both know S ab but not S e while Eve knows S e and S ab . This is depicted in Figure 2 . Note that this is a conservative assumption which allows us to derive tight information leakage bounds for any state realization s ab (see Section IV).
We call the state memoryless if
Similarly, the source is memoryless if
Note that in (10) one sees the effect of the sparsity coherence period. The triplet of source samples
is conditionally and independently generated from the same state pair There are two types of degradedness we now define for the eavesdropper: state degradation and observation degradation. We will say that the an eavesdropper is degraded if both hold. (12) and (13) hold.
Definition 1 (Degradedness
If S e is a degraded version of S ab then we have the Markov relation (X, Y ) − S ab − S e . We note that this is a natural condition for the sparse wireless channel model: S e might give us some idea of which delay bins the non-zero reflectors are in, i.e., S ab , but it is not likely to give us a sense of the small-scale fading effects that yield the non-zero values of the fading coefficients in those bins, i.e., X and Y . If Eve's observation Z is a degraded version of Bob's observation Y then, for any given states (s ab , s e ), Eve's output is a cascade of Bob's output and a channel represented by p(z|y, s ab , s e ). This is natural due to the motivation of reciprocal wireless channel -anyone other than Alice and Bob will have a worse estimate of the channel between them. Combining these two aspects into the condition for a degraded eavesdropper means that we can rewrite (11) as p(x, y, z|s ab , s e ) = p(x, y|s ab )p(z|y, s ab , s e ) .
C. One-way discussion key generation protocol
T MR } be the key space. There is an authenticated public channel available to users to exchange error-free public messages in the set {1, . . . , 2
T MR φ }. The one-way public discussion secret key generation protocol consists of three functions:
which define Alice's key, public message, and Bob's key, respectively. Namely, 
Condition (19) means the key is almost uniformly distributed over the set K. System secrecy is measured in terms of the mutual information defined in (18) which says that the information about the key leaked to eavesdropper is negligible. We note that in the above definition the units of key rate, and of leakage rate, are bits (or nats) per channel usage, i.e., H(K) is normalized by T M. This will prove convenient in our discussions of both the ergodic and outage situations where we let M or T be arbitrarily large. The supremum of achievable secret key rates is called the secret key capacity 6 .
III. BOUNDS ON ERGODIC SECRET KEY CAPACITY
For applications that can tolerate long delays, the key generation protocol can operate across a large number of independent state realizations. In this setting the parameter T , which models the number of channel uses across which each state realization remains constant, is kept fixed while M is allowed to grow arbitrarily large. In this setting the secret key capacity in the Shannon sense is well-defined and is termed the ergodic secret key capacity. 
A. Bounds on Ergodic Capacity of SD-DMMS
The theorems developed by Ahlswede, Csiszár [1, Theorem 1] and Maurer [2, Theorem 1,2] can be applied to the ergodic case of the source model in Figure 2 to get the following lemma.
Proof. The proof is given in Appendix A. 6 In contrast to the focus on weak secrecy in this paper, in [41] results are developed on the strong secret key capacity, in which the error probability (17) and information leakage rate (18) decrease exponentially in block length.
The following corollary says that the upper and lower bound equal one another when the eavesdropper's observation is degraded. (14) , the ergodic secret key capacity is
Corollary 2. When the eavesdropper's source is degraded
Proof. It can be verified by examining (22) 
er , where the equality (a) is due to the degradedness conditions defined in (12) and (13) so that, respectively, I(X; Y |S ab , S e ) = I(X; Y |S ab ) and I(X; Z|Y, S ab , S e ) = 0. Equality (b) is also due to (12) so that S e is conditionally independent of X given S ab .
Remark 2: While in this paper we analyze the case when Eve knows the sparsity pattern of the main channel S ab , for the ergodic case it is a simple exercise to extend the results to the case were Eve knows only S e (and not S ab ). In the proofs of the appendix one simply does not include S ab in Eve's observation set. The results come out similarly except that there is an additional, common, term in C er , C + er , and C − er . This term is
T H(S ab |Z
T , S e ) which is the entropy contained in the sparsity pattern observed by Alice and Bob, but not (in this setting) by Eve. Note that when the state changes slowly (or equivalently when T is large)
T , S e ) → 0. In this situation the contribution to the secret key capacity due to the sparsity pattern S ab becomes negligible, and the capacity approaches (from above) the capacity result of this section. As discussed in Section II-A this is a common situation.
B. Ergodic secret key rate of sparse wireless channel
We now apply Corollary 2 to the sparse channel model specified in II-A. In Section III-B1 we examine the expressions for mutual information I(X; Y |S ab ) and I(X; Z, S e |S ab ) for the vector channel described by (2) and (6). Then, in Section III-B2 we identify conditions under which the eavesdropper's observation is degraded. Finally, in Sections III-B3 and III-B4 we focus on the randomness due to the sparsity patterns and analyze the wideband limit.
1) Mutual information:
Define Q to be the product S ab, × S e, so Q ∈ {0, 1}. Thus Q = 1 if and only if the support (the sparsity pattern) of H ab and of H e are both non-zero in the -th delay bin. Also define two functions:
I e (γ a , γ e ) = log
. We show in Appendix B that
In the above expressions, the expectation is taken over the random length-L max sparsity patterns S ab and S e . Note the factor Q in (26b). When S ab, = 1 but S e, = 0 the eavesdropper has no measurement of that channel coefficient (Q = 0). Thus, the eavesdropper has no observation of that common randomness and the negative mutual information term in (23) is zero. It is clear in (26) that the channel sparsity patterns (S ab and S e ) affect the mutual information in two ways. The first is via the number of terms in the summation, i.e., the number of channel DoF. The second is via the correlation coefficient η which affects the information leakage through the I e (·) in each delay bin observed by the eavesdropper.
2) Degraded condition: Because Eve's channel is correlated to the main channel, she may get a good estimation of H ab if she has a higher SNR than Alice or Bob. To guarantee the positivity of the secret key rate, we need to characterize the conditions under which Eve's observation is of lower quality than either Alice's or Bob's. To develop such a condition we concentrate on delay bins where Q = 1. We note that in delay bins such that Q = 0 either S ab, = 0 or Eve has no observation of H ab, , so there is no need to consider those delay bins. Projecting the channel outputs onto d , the -th column of D, we get
Because the sounding signal is an (asymptotically) white sequence, X (and Y ) form a sufficient statistic for estimating H ab, . The noise W 1, (resp. W 2, ) is a zero mean complex Gaussian with variance P σ 2 a (resp. P σ 2 b ). Similarly, Eve's sufficient statistic is
Because η(H ab, , H e, ) = η, we have equivalently written H e, as a sum of two terms. The first term is a scaled version of H ab, . The second, H , is a CN 0, υ 2 random variable that is independent of H ab, . We see from (28) that Eve's observation Z contains two types of noise. The first is the receiver noise W 3, . The second is due to the uncorrelated H .
Eve's observation Z will be a degraded version of Y if Eve has a lower SNR than Bob. This occurs if
Otherwise, Y is a degraded version of Z . If the sounding signal power is small and Eve has a suitably smaller noise variance σ 2 e , in particular, when
then Bob's output is noisier and no secret key can be extracted at a positive rate from the -th delay bin. This is because when P is small, Eve's independent noise (due to H ) is decreased. It is observed in [42] that there is a cutoff SNR below which the secret key capacity is zero. If ν 2 = υ 2 and all the users (Alice, Bob and Eve) are operating at the same SNR, i.e., σ
2 , the secret key capacity will always be positive because Eve experiences additional noise (due to the uncorrelated H ).
3) Achievable secret key rate: In order to see the effect of channel sparsity when the bandwidth is large (but finite), we focus on the equal-SNR case and consider a uniform delay profile. Per the above discussion this is a degraded eavesdropper setting. Define the random number of non-zero channel coefficients in the main Alice-to-Bob and in Eve's channel to be, respectively, Be for all for which S e, = 1. Let I s (P ) be the instantaneous key rate I(X; Y |S ab ) − I(X; Z, S e |S ab ) for fixed S ab and S e . i.e.,
where γ P σ 2 and
is the number of overlapping delay bins. From (26) and Corollary 2 the achievable secret key rate is
As we will see later in Section III-B4, I s (γ) is convex in low SNR (as also is I er (γ)). From Corollary 2, I er (γ) is the ergodic capacity when users use a uniform sounding signal with constant power P . If users are allowed to adapt their sounding scheme to the channel sparsity level, a uniform sounding strategy is not optimal. Let P denote all sounding policies that satisfy average power constraint E[d H d] ≤ P , we can achieve
Theorem 3 (Time-sharing sounding achieves capacity). Let the time-sharing parameters set
then the ergodic secret key capacity subject to average power constraint is
Proof. Provided in Appendix C.
The physical interpretation of the auxiliary variable λ is that the key rate λI er (γ 1 ) + (1 − λ)I er (γ 2 ) can be achieved by a time-sharing strategy that sounds the channel during some fraction λ, 0 < λ ≤ 1, of the time at SNR γ 1 and the remainder the time at SNR γ 2 . Theorem 3 says that the ergodic secret key capacity can be achieved by a λ * timesharing sounding strategy where (λ * , γ * 1 , γ * 2 ) is the triplet that maximizes (37) . As we discuss later in Section III-B4, in the wideband regime I er (γ) is convex when γ is small, so a good choice is to set γ 2 = 0 and γ 1 = γ λ * . This corresponds to an on-off sounding strategy. One finds that at low SNRs (as γ → 0) a sparser sounding pattern (i.e., λ * → 0) is better, while at high SNRs, a denser sounding pattern is better (i.e., λ * → 1).
4) Wideband regime:
One way to increase the secret key capacity is to increase the bandwidth W of the wireless channel. However, in most real-world settings the channel DoF do not increase linearly in W . To see how W affects the secret key rate, we examine C er (P ) from (37) in the wideband regime.
In the wideband case, each channel DoF is sounded at a low SNR. At low SNR we can approximate (25) as
for x and y small. The ergodic key rate
The approximation (a) is accurate when L 1 (cf. [43, eq. (5)]). The right hand side of (39) is a quadratic function of γ, thus I er (γ) is convex in γ at low SNRs. Figure 3 plots I er (γ) versus γ, for a bandwidth of W = 100 MHz, τ max = 10μs, and for various values of the sparsity parameter δ ∈ [0.5, 1]. We see that a sparser channel (small δ) achieves a higher key rate at low SNRs. We can also observe this from (39) . According to Theorem 3 and noticing that (39) is quadratic in γ, a sparser signal in time (an on-off signal) results in a higher secret key rate. In other words, in the wideband (power-limited) regime, fewer DoF (either in channel or in time domain) can achieve a higher key rate. This occurs because the key generation problem is a combined channel sounding and channel coding problem: channel sounding due to the channel excitation, and channel coding due to the denoising by public messaging. By focusing energy on fewer DoF we raise their SNR, enabling key generation to occur at Fig. 3 . The achievable secret key rate Ier(γ) plotted versus γ, the signal-tonoise ratio (SNR). The bandwidth used in the example is W = 100 MHz, the maximum delay spread is set to τmax = 10μs, the conditional probability of overlap in S ab and Se is θ = 0.5, and the correlation between channel coefficients is η = 0.1. The value of Ier(γ) is plotted for various sparsity levels δ ∈ {0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1}. a higher rate. In contrast, a richer channel (large δ) results in a higher key rate at a high SNR since that is a DoF-limited (and not a power-limited) regime.
Figures 4 and 5 plot I er as a function of W . This provides another view of the tradeoff between power and DoF. In Figure 4 we fix γ at 10 dB, η = 0.8, θ ∈ {0.2, 0.8} and plot I er for different values of channel sparsity δ in the range [0.5, 1). We note that in the wideband regime, i.e., at low SNRs, a larger δ results in a smaller key rate. Thus, in this regime a sparser channel is better. In Figure 5 we fix the channel sparsity δ = 0.5 and plot I er as a function of γ for SNRs ranging from 10dB to 30dB and η ∈ {0.1, 0.8}. We see that at each SNR, there is a unique channel bandwidth W * that maximizes the key rate.
To close this section we make some notes on practical aspects of our setting. First, the capacity results assume knowl- edge of Eve's statistical correlations (θ, η). In the real world, users may not be able to know that information. However, (θ, η) can be considered as a part of threat model in a system to parameterize the level of system security. The actual sounding signal (e.g., SNR, time-sharing) and key rate would be chosen to satisfy security requirements.
IV. SECRECY OUTAGE
In this section we consider an analysis appropriate to situations in which the communication system is subject to a stringent delay requirement. In particular say that the allowable delay is of the same order as the time-scale at which the sparsity pattern changes. In this situation the pattern is roughly constant during the key generation process. Since users know only their own state, and not Eve's, they cannot adapt their key generation process to Eve's state. Thus, satisfying the secrecy condition (18) is problematic and the secret key capacity in the Shannon sense is not well defined.
In this section we consider an outage formulation. To study this setting we set M = 1 while allowing T to be arbitrarily large. For any realization (S ab , S e ) = (s ab , s e ) we say that a rate-R e secrecy outage occurs if
for some R e > 0. This means that there is a non-vanishing information rate leaked to Eve. For compactness in the rest of the paper, we adopt the notation I(X; Y |S = s) = I(X; Y |s) and H(X|S = s) = H(X|s), i.e., replacing S = s with s. Define two quantities, Theorem 4 provides upper and lower bounds on the rate of information leakage. Since both Alice and Bob know the realization of S ab they can choose the key rate and the public message rate to be a function of s ab . While this was also true in the ergodic case, there we were able to set the key and public messaging rate to satisfy the expected channel state conditions. In contrast, in the outage setting we experience only a single realization of the state. It will thus be helpful to indicate the dependence explicitly as we will study various choices for the rates. We denote the key rate as R(s ab ) and the public message rate as R φ (s ab ). 
and (ii) There exists a coding scheme that satisfies (17) , (19) and
Proof. The proof can be found in Appendix D. Equality (a) follows from the condition for state degradedness (12) and (b) from that for observation degradedness (13) .
A. Wideband sparse channel
In the reciprocal wireless channel case, we know from Section III-B that C s (S ab , S e ) = I s (γ), as is given in (32) . Using the approximations from (38), we have in the wideband regime that
Recall that B ab (resp. B e ) is the weight of the vector S ab (resp. S e ), cf. (31), and B q is the weight of support common to S ab and S e , cf. (33) . Also note that B ab , B e , B q are random variables, meaning that the overall quantity in (45) is also random. Unfortunately, there is no simple expression for the distribution of C s (S ab , S e ) in (45) . Since the users are assumed to know S ab (and, therefore, B ab ), in order to understand how the channel sparsity affects the probability of outage, we consider the case where B ab = L (recall that in our model L = E[B ab ] which is also the most likely value of B ab ), similarly we assume that B e = L. Thus, the only uncertainty the users have is B q . This is the number of delay bins from which Eve can learn the key. Conditioned on B ab = L, and according to the correlation model of (8), B q has a Binomial distribution Bino (L, θ). Applying these assumptions to Theorem 4, the outage probability is
where L = (W τ max ) δ . We see that a larger signal-tonoise ratio γ, a larger W , or a smaller η will decrease the outage probability. However, the sparsity δ changes both the distribution of B q and the right hand side of the argument in (46) via L. Thus, it is not immediately clear how δ impact P out . When users don't know the instantaneous secret key capacity, a conservative strategy is to generate a key at a smaller rate.
We now consider a strategy in which the key is generated at rate R = αI er (γ) where 0 < α < 1. This strategy backs off from the ergodic key rate (39) by a constant factor. We refer to this strategy as the "α-backoff" strategy. The outage probability (46) can now be simplified to be
Since B q is approximately Bino (L, θ), the sparsity δ (and therefore the actual number of degrees-of-freedom L) determines the distribution of B q , which characterizes Eve's ability to observe the main channel. From (47), we can see that when the α-backoff strategy is used, the correlation coefficient η determines how fast the threshold aL deviates from θL (the mean of B q ) as α is decreased. Note that in (47), the SNR (or, equivalently, the power P ) does not appear in the formula. This is because the key rate is proportional to the ergodic key rate I er (γ), which is a quadratic function of γ in the wideband regime, cf. (39) , and thus cancels the γ 2 that appears in (46) . We next use results from large deviation theory [44] to upper bound the tail probability of a binomial distribution. 
is the Kullback-Leibler divergence between the probability distributions Bern (a) and Bern (p).
By this lemma, the outage probability is upper bounded as Figure 6 plots the numerical results of the secrecy outage exponent LD(a θ) in the wideband regime. It shows that when the α-backoff strategy is used, the mechanism through which channel sparsity impacts the outage probability differs from how the channel sparsity impacts the ergodic secret key rate. A richer channel (larger δ) always has larger exponent than a sparser channel. In contrast, Figure 3 demonstrates a sparser channel yields a higher ergodic secret key rate in the wideband regime.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we study a setting in which two users desire to distill a common secret key based on the inherent randomness of a reciprocal wireless channel. Our particular interest is in the effect of channel sparsity, e.g., in the delay domain, on the reliable rate of secret key generation. Channel density often scales sub-linearly in signal bandwidth. This scaling affects the inherent randomness of the main channel and increases the eavesdropper's ability to observe the main channel. Since channel sparsity is an important characteristic of many realworld wireless channels, and since it has such a large impact on secret key capacity, it is crucial to understand better the interplay between channel sparsity and the achievable rates of secret key generation. Such understanding is important to be able to deliver secure communication systems with robust guarantees. In this paper we consider two settings: ergodic and nonergodic. In the ergodic setting, at each SNR there is an adequate bandwidth to maximizes the secret key rate. Moreover, we find that when a white sounding sequence is adopted in the wideband (low-SNR) regime, a higher secret key rate is achieved by a sparser channel. This is due to the focusing of the transmitted energy on the fewer non-zero channel coefficients. In the non-ergodic setting, for channels whose sparsity changes relatively slowly, we adopt a secrecy outage measure of performance. If the key rate is a fraction α of the ergodic capacity, we show that richer channels always have larger exponents which characterize the decay of the probability of outage. This results indicates that a larger number of degrees-of-freedom can smooth out the detrimental effects of an unknown eavesdropper state.
Interesting future directions include the characterization of two-way capacity. In this setting Bob is able to send public side information to Alice to help her recover Y T M , in addition to Alice's message to Bob. The capacity of this model will, in general, be different from the one-way capacity characterized in this paper. A second extension is to random sounding. In the model considered herein the signal used to excite the reciprocal wireless channel is a deterministic sequence. If a randomized sounding signal were used (based on private sources of randomness) the randomization could be used to embed additional confidential. In [11] an initial investigation of this setting is made in the context of ergodic channels.
APPENDIX

A. Proof of Lemma 1
We first prove the lower bound (23) . We start by applying the results of Theorem 1 in [1] where in the following we use (U , T , Y , Z ) to correspond, respectively, to the random variables (U, T, Y, Z) used in [1] . We make the following choice of (auxiliary) random variables U = ∅, T = (X T , S ab ), Y = (Y T , S ab ) and Z = (Z T , S e , S ab ). We note that these choices include the state and the length-T channel outputs for each user during a single state coherentB. Derivation of mutual information (26) First consider I(X; Y |S ab ):
where h(X) is the differential entropy [45] of X, and the expectation is taken over the distribution of S ab . Let R X denote the covariance matrix of X when the input S ab is fixed to the sample vector S, i.e., S ab = S. We have 
We simplify the determinants as follows: Substituting into (54), we get (26a). Follow a similar calculation, we get I(X; Z, S e |S ab ) in (26b) by noting that
where R hh is a diagonal matrix and its -th diagonal element is equal to ην 2 if Q = 1 or is equal to zero if Q = 0.
C. Proof of Theorem 3
The proof is similar to [10, Theorem 4] . First note that I s (γ) is non-decreasing in γ and so is I er (γ). This can be verified by evaluating ∂Is(γ) ∂γ , which is non-negative. Recall from (37) thatĪ er (γ) = max (λ,γ1,γ2)∈Ω λI er (γ 1 ) + (1 − λ)I er (γ 2 ) ,
where Ω is defined in (36) . Note thatĪ er (γ) is also a nondecreasing function of γ. Since I er (γ) is not a concave function its hypograph [46] hypo I er (γ) = {(γ, t)|t ≤ I er (γ)} is not a convex set. Now, by construction we observe that the hypograph ofĪ er (γ) is the convex hull of hypo I er (γ). But, since I er (γ) is concave for γ sufficiently large this tells us that, hypo I er (γ) is a convex set, therefore,Ī er (γ) is concave. We now show thatĪ er P σ 2 is equal to C er P σ 2 defined in (35) over the average power constraint P . Let P be the set of all sounding policies satisfying average power constraint P . Specifically, let the sounding policy in P allocate power P s to sounding signals with probability p(s) 
where (a) and (b) are due to the concavity ofĪ er (γ) and its non-decreasing character.
following sequence of (in)equalities:
